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In Western Europe, USA and other developed countries agriculture is dominated by small family 
farms. In Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and Former Soviet Union (FSU) dual 
structure of farms exists. There are large corporate farms (CF) and small family farms (FF) in 
CEEC and FSU. Our paper shows that both CF and FF specialize in commodities in which they 
have comparative advantage. CF specialize in capital intensive products and in products with low 
labor  monitoring.  FF  specialize  in  products  with  higher  labor  monitoring  requirements.  The 
implication of this paper is that farm structure determines in which products the country will be 
competitive on international markets. This is especially important for transition countries where 
high  transaction  costs  hinder  the  change  of  farm  organization.  For  this  reason  in  transition 
countries suffering from high transaction cost the choice of product structure is more important 
than the choice of farm organization.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
In Western Europe, USA and other developed countries agricultural sector is dominated 
by  relatively  small  family  farms.  The  situation  is  different  in  Central  and  Eastern  European 
Countries (CEEC) and Former Soviet Union (FSU) where dual structure of farms exists. There 
are  large  corporate  farms  (CF)  and  relatively  small  family  farms  (FF)  in  CEEC  and  FSU. 
Average farm size in CEEC and FSU is significantly higher than in Western Europe or USA 
(Table 1).  
Literature from the 1990s predicted that the large cooperative farms in CEEC and FSU 
would transform into family farms and the farm structure in CEEC would become similar to that 
in    Western  Europe  and  the USA  because  FF  are  more  efficient  than  CF  (SCHMITT  1991; 
CSAKI  AND  LERMAN  1996;  HAGEDORN  1994).  This  transformation  has  not  occurred, 
however.  
Growing  empirical  literature  tried  to  explain  why  CF  did  not  transform  into  FF  by 
comparing efficiency of FF and CF in different countries of CEEC and FSU (BRÜMMER 2001; 
MATHIJS AND SWINNEN 2001; HUGHES 2000; MATHIJS AND VRANKEN 2000). The 
paper of GORTON AND DAVIDOVA (2004) summarizes the findings on efficiency of farms in 
CEEC. Out of 7 papers reviewed, 2 found that FF were more efficient than CF, 4  found mixed 
results and 1 found that CF were more productive than FF. The paper also finds that in countries 
where markets for inputs and services for small farms are more developed and where there is 
longer experience with private farming, FF tend to be more efficient. In countries were this is not 
the case the results are  mixed (GORTON AND DAVIDOVA 2004). Therefore, literature on 
efficiency does not provide a clear explanation why CF have not transformed into FF. A more 




Table 1: Farm size in EU-15 and USA 
  Average farm size 
(ha) 
EU-15  20 
USA  197 
Source: European Commission, USDA. 
The paper by CIAIAN AND SWINNEN (2006) provides a partial equilibrium theoretical 
model that explains why CF persist. Large scale CF continue to use large part of land because 
emerging family farms face significant transaction costs to obtain land from the established CF. 
Transactions costs include costs involved in bargaining with the farm management, in obtaining 
information on land and tenure regulations, in implementing delineation of the land and dealing 
with inheritance and co-owners (SWAIN 1999; PROSTERMAN AND ROLFES 1999; CIAIAN 
AND SWINNEN 2006).  
From  the  literature  it  follows  that  there  are  significant  transaction  costs  to  transform 
existing CF into FF and because of this CEEC and FSU are still dominated by large scale CF. In 
other words, large transaction costs help CF to keep a large share of land at the expense of FF.  
Transaction costs explain why CF can keep their dominant position in CEEC and FSU 
even if FF are more efficient. If many CEEC and FSU are stuck with CF, an important question 
arises: Do profit maximizing CF produce the same commodities as profit maximizing FF? To put 
it another way, does production structure of CF differ from production structure of FF? Or, does 
farm  organization  has  an  impact  on  production  structure?  ALLEN  AND  LUECK  (2002) 
developed  a  model  explaining  how  characteristics  of  products  affect  the  choice  of  farm 
organization.  Their  model  is  based  on  trade-off  between  moral  hazard  and  gains  from 
specialization. Our approach is complementary to that approach. We consider the choice of farm 
organization as given because of initial conditions (existence of large cooperatives at the end of 
communist era) and high transaction cost of the change of organization form; and investigate how 
farm organization affects the production structure. ALLEN AND LUECK (2002), on the other 
hand,  investigate  how  product  characteristics  affect  the  choice  of  farm  organization.  Their 
approach does not consider transaction costs of changing of farm organization.  
Whether farm organization affects production structure is an important question for policy 
makers because transaction costs of the change of farm organization can be affected by political 
decisions  and  it  is  important  to  know  how  farm  organization  affects  production  structure  of 
agricultural sector and how it is related to the loss of efficiency. Theoretically the paper provides 
insights  into  the  impact  of  transaction  costs  on  production  structure  and  development  of 
production structure in transition countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the development of 
farm structure in CEEC and FSU. The third section is devoted to capital intensity and monitoring 
of  labor  in  agriculture,  which  is  followed  by  a  section  on  empirical  evidence  of  farm 
specialization. The last section summarizes and draws conclusions.  
2  DEVELOPMENT OF FARM STRUCTURES IN CEEC AND FSU 
The structure of agriculture in CEEC and FSU in the communist period was strongly 
biased towards extremely large farms directly controlled by the state. The average farm size  
 
ranged from 1 157 hectares in Poland to around 124 770 hectares in Turkmenistan. This size was 
very large compared to average farm size in market economies such as the EU or USA (Table 1).  
In  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  private  property  rights  were  restored  by  privatization 
process.  In  CEEC, except  for  Albania,  land  and  agricultural  assets  were restituted to  former 
owners. FSU and Albania distributed land and assets to farm workers. Hungary and Romania 
combined the distribution of land and assets to workers with the restitution to former owners 
(CIAIAN  AND  POKRIVCAK  2007;  SWINNEN  AND  ROZELLE  2005;  LERMAN,  CSAKI 
AND FEDER 2004; LERMAN 1999).  
Farm  restructuring  followed  after  privatization  process.  New  private  owners  of  farm 
assets and land were allowed to break away from cooperative farms and to start family farming. 
This led to the creation of family farms that were significantly smaller in size than cooperatives, 
but comparable to their Western European or American counterparts (Tables 1 and 2). Not all 
cooperative farms broke up into family farms, however. Some cooperatives were transformed. 
That is, old socialist cooperatives were turned into cooperatives of owners of agricultural assets 
(including land), joint-stock companies, limited-liability companies or partnerships. During this 
process the size structure of farms changed toward smaller units. 
Depending  on  the  methods  of  privatization  and  government  policies  of  restructuring, 
different farm structures emerged in different transition countries. While in Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and most FSU countries, agriculture is still dominated by large transformed corporate 
farms, Albania and Baltic States have created many small size family farms.  There is a broad 
spectrum of farm structures in between these two extreme cases (Table 2). 
3  CAPITAL INTENSITY AND MONITORING OF LABOR IN AGRICULTURE 
  There are several studies that evaluate advantages of FF relative to CF. According 
to these studies FF do not suffer from moral hazard problem as farmer is residual claimant. On 
the  other  hand,  FF  are  hindered  by  lack of  labor specialization,  which  reduces  the  marginal 
product  of  labor.  Furthermore,  FF  face  higher  costs  for  capital  compared  to  partnerships,  or 
corporations,  and  therefore  use  less  capital,  implying  a  smaller  farm  with  less  equipment 
compared to partnerships and factory-corporate farms (ALLEN AND LUECK 2002; POLLAK 
1985). 
ALLEN AND  LUECK  (2002,  p.  179  -  180)  explained  how the  choice  of farm  organization 
changes with the type of product: 
·  As  the  importance  of  labor  specialization  increases,  the  FF  becomes  less  likely  and  CF 
becomes more likely, 
·  As the number of tasks increases, the FF becomes less likely, 
·  As  the  length  of  a  stage  (such  as  length  for  planting  and  harvesting  in  terms  of  time, 
temperature, rainfall, etc.) increases, the FF becomes less likely,  
·  As the number of cycles (the number of times per year the entire production cycle can be 
completed)  per  year  increases,  the  total  amount  of  time  that  a  single  task  is  undertaken 
increases over a give year, making the FF less likely, 
Table 2: Farm structures in transition countries 
  Family farms    Transformed cooperative farms  Year  
 
  Share of TAA (%)  Average size 
(ha)    Share of TAA (%)  Average size 
(ha) 
 
Albania*  96  ─    4  ─  1998 
Bulgaria  44  1    55  861  1997 
Czech Republic  28  20    72  937  2003 
Hungary  59  4    41  312  2000 
Poland  87  8    13  ─  2003 
Romania  55  2    45  274  2002 
Slovakia  12  42    88  1185  2003 
Slovenia  94  ─    6  ─  2000 
Estonia  63  2    37  327  2001 
Latvia  90  12    10  297  2001 
Lithuania  89  4    11  483  2003 
Armenia  32  ─    68  ─  1997 
Azerbaijan  9  ─    91  ─  1997 
Belarus  16  ─    84  ─  1997 
Georgia  24  ─    76  ─  1997 
Kazakhstan  20  ─    80  ─  1997 
Kyrgyzstan   23  ─    77  ─  1997 
Moldavia  27  ─    73  1 400  1997 
Russia  11  ─    89  6 100  1997 
Tajikistan  7  ─    93  ─  1997 
Turkmenistan  0.3  ─    99.7  ─  1997 
Uzbekistan  4  ─    96  ─  1997 
Ukraine  17  ─    83  2 100  1997 
Notes: TAA – Total Agricultural Area;   * for arable land only 
Sources:  Bulgaria:  Bulgarian  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry;  Czech  Republic:  Czech  Statistical  Office; 
Estonia: Statistical Office of Estonia; Hungary: European Commission; Poland: Central Statistical Office; Latvia: 
Statistical Office of Latvia; Lithuania: Statistical Office of Lithuania; Slovenia: Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Slovenia,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova,  Russia,  Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan: Lerman, Csaki, and Feder (2002); Albania: Albanian Ministry of Agriculture; 
Slovakia: Ministry of Agriculture; Romania: Romanian National Institute of Statistics. 
·  As variance in the stage-specific shock (e.g. pests, weather, etc.) increases, the FF becomes 
more likely, 
·  As the cost of monitoring labor increases, the  family farm and partnership become more 
likely. 
·  As farm organization shifts from FF to CF, capital stock per farm increases. 
ALLEN  AND  LUECK  (2002)  do  not  consider  transaction  costs  to  change  farm 
organization  from  CF  to  FF.  The  literature  on  transition  countries  (e.g.  CIAIAN  AND 
SWINNEN  2006),  however,  asserts that  these  transaction  costs  are  significant; hindering  the  
 
growth of family farms. Therefore, in transition countries like CEEC and FSU the crucial choice 
is not between farm organization, that is between FF and CF, but rather what production structure 
is chosen by CF and FF, respectively. High transaction costs protect the existence of CF, but CF 
have  still  to  choose  the  production  structure  to  strengthen  their  competitiveness  on  the  land 
market relative to growing FF; and on the output market relative to FF at home as well as with 
respect to international competitors.  
Farms  choose  production  structure  in  which  they  have  comparative  advantage.  The 
comparative advantage of large CF is in capital intensive product types for which monitoring of 
labor is relatively low and in which specialization of labor is possible. On the other hand, small 
FF have comparative advantage in products in which labor monitoring is important, measurement 
of labor effort is difficult and capital intensity is unimportant.  
Next, we empirically evaluate agricultural commodities taking into account monitoring 
requirements and capital intensity. Based on this, we identify in which products FF and CF have 
comparative advantage.  
Data for measuring labor monitoring requirements and capital intensity explicitly for each 
commodity  is  not  available.  Therefore  labor  per  hectare  for  a  farm  type  specialized  by 
commodity serves as a proxy for labor monitoring requirement per commodity. Amount of labor 
per  hectare  for  a  farm  type  specialized  by  commodity  was  obtained  from  FADN  (Farm 
Accountancy Data Network) data of the European Commission. Number of labor per hectare is 
measured as annual work unit (AWU)
1  per hectare. Capital intensity was also computed for each 
farm type specialized by commodity as a ratio of capital costs
2 to labor costs
3. We considered the 
following six farm types: 1) Farm specialized in cereals, oilseed  and protein crops; 2) Farm 
specialized in field crops (root crops, combined cereals and root crops, field vegetables, or other 
field  crops  (tobacco,  cotton,  etc.);  3)  Farm  specialized  in  permanent  crops  (horticulture, 
vineyards,  olives,  fruits);  4)  Farm  specialized  in  livestock  (dairy,  cattle,  sheep);  5)  Farm 
specialized  in  granivores  (pig  and  poultry);  and  6)  Mixed  farms  (mixed  crop  farms,  mixed 
livestock  farms,  mixed  livestock  and  crop  farms).  FADN  data  were  not  available  for  FSU 
countries. Data were available only for 8 transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
(the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). To 
check the robustness of results we performed the same analysis for EU-15 member states. We 
used ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors to address heteroskedasticity problem.  
In our regressions dependent variables were AWU per hectare for year 2004 in the case of 
8 CEEC; and AWU per hectare averaged over five  years, 2000-2004, in the case of EU-15. 
Explanatory variables were farm types and country dummies (not reported). Country dummies 
were included to take account of the country specific effects. The results are shown in Tables 3 
and 4. To estimate the capital intensity, dependent variable was capital costs divided by labor 
costs for each farm type for 2004 in the case of 8 CEEC and capital costs divided by labor costs 
averaged over five years, 2000-2004, in the case of EU-15. Similarly, explanatory variables were 
farm types and country dummies (not reported) to take account of the country specific effects. 
Results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.  
                                                 
1 AWU measures the total labor input of holding expressed in annual work units (equal to full-time person 
equivalents). 
2 Capital costs include depreciation, energy costs, machinery and building current consumption.  
3 Labor costs include wage costs.  
 
Table 3: Labor per hectare in CEEC 
  Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops 
Field crop  Permanent 
crop 
Livestock  Granivores  Mixed 
farms 
Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops  ─  -0.02  -0.32***  -0.02  -0.19***  -0.04** 
Field crop  0.02  ─  -0.30***  0.01  -0.16**  -0.02 
Permanent crop  0.32***  0.30***  ─  0.30***  0.13  0.28*** 
Livestock  0.02  -0.01  -0.30***  ─  -0.17**  -0.02 
Granivores  0.19***  0.16**  -0.13  0.17**  ─  0.15** 
Mixed farms  0.04**  0.02  -0.28***  0.02  -0.15**  ─ 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: own calculations 
Table 4: Labor per hectare in EU-15 
  Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops 
Field crop  Permanent 
crop 
Livestock  Granivores  Mixed 
farms 
Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops  ─  -0.01  -0.33***  -0.02  -0.09***  -0.03** 
Field crop  0.01  ─  -0.31***  -0.01  -0.08***  -0.02 
Permanent crop  0.33***  0.31***  ─  0.30***  0.24***  0.29*** 
Livestock  0.02  0.01  -0.30***  ─  -0.07**  -0.01 
Granivores  0.09***  0.08***  -0.24***  0.07**  ─  0.06** 
Mixed farms  0.03**  0.02  -0.29***  0.01  -0.06**  ─ 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: own calculations 
The result of regression estimating labor requirements per hectare (AWU per hectare) are 
shown in Tables 3 and 4 for CEEC and EU-15, respectively. There is a high level of consistency 
between CEEC and EU-15 results. A positive value (e.g. 0.32 for row 3 denoting permanent 
crops and column 1 denoting cereals, oilseeds and protein crops) implies that the respective type 
of farm in row 3 (farm specialized in permanent crops) has labor requirement per hectare higher 
(by 0.32) than a farm in column 1 (farm specialized in cereals, oilseed and protein crops). The 
opposite holds if the estimated parameter is negative. Livestock farm type (row 4) has labor 
requirement lower by 0.30 than permanent crop farm (column 3). From Tables 3 and 4 it can be 
concluded  that  the  highest  labor  per  hectare  is  required  for  permanent  crops,  followed  by 
granivores, livestock, field crops and cereals and oilseeds.  
 
Table 5: Relative capital costs to labor costs in CEEC 
  Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops 
Field crop  Permanent 
crop 
Livestock  Granivores  Mixed 
farms 
Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops  ─  2.1  9.2*  -9.4*  3.5  -1.0 
Field crop  -2.1  ─  7.1  -11.6**  1.4  -3.1 
Permanent crop  -9.2*  -7.1  ─  -18.6**  -5.6  -10.1 
Livestock  9.4*  11.6**  18.6**  ─  13.0**  8.5 
Granivores  -3.5  -1.4  5.6  -13.0**  ─  -4.5 
Mixed farms  1.0  3.1  10.1  -8.5  4.5  ─ 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: own calculations 
Tables  5  and  6  show  estimation  results  for  capital  intensity  by  farm  type.  The 
interpretation  of  the  results  is  the  same  as  in  Tables  3  and  4.  Similar  to  labor  monitoring 
estimates, there is relatively high consistency between CEEC and EU-15 results but for the EU-
15 statistical significance of the estimations is stronger. The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 
show  that  livestock  production  is  the  most  capital  intensive  followed  by  cereals,  oilseeds, 
permanent crops and field crops.  
Table 7 summarizes the importance of labor monitoring and capital intensity by farm 
types.  Based  on  the  results  obtained  from  the  estimations,  we  constructed  ranking  of  labor 
monitoring requirement and capital intensity for each farm type. The farm type that requires most 
labor per hectare or the farm type that is the most capital intensive received 5 stars, while the 
farm type that is the least capital intensive or requires the least labor per hectare received 1 star. 
Mixed  farms  were excluded  from  analysis because  labor  monitoring  requirement  and  capital 
intensity  cannot  be  associated  with  a specific  product  type  unambiguously. Mixed  farms  are 
involved in both animal production and crop production. Based on the ranking in Table 7, we 
identified sectors in which FF and CF have comparative advantage. From the Table 7 we can 
conclude that CF have comparative advantage in cereals and oilseed production, while FF have 
comparative  advantage  in  permanent  crops.  Cereals  and  oilseed  production  have  low  labor 
requirement and are capital intensive. Permanent crops are just the opposite, they have high labor 




Table 6: Relative capital costs to labor costs in EU-15 
  Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops 
Field crop  Permanent 
crop 




and protein crops  ─  9.4***  11.5***  -2.2  3.4  5.1* 
Field crop  -9.4***  ─  2.1  -11.6***  -6.0**  -4.3** 
Permanent crop  -11.5***  -2.1  ─  -13.7***  -8.1***  -6.4*** 
Livestock  2.2  11.6***  13.7***  ─  5.6**  7.2*** 
Granivores  -3.4  6.0**  8.1***  -5.6**  ─  1.7 
Mixed farms  -5.1*  4.3**  6.4***  -7.2***  -1.7  ─ 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: own calculations 
Table 7: Importance of labor monitoring requirements and capital intensity by farm type 
and farm comparative advantage 
  Cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops 
Field crop  Permanent 
crop 
Livestock  Granivores 
Labor monitoring  *  * *  * * * * *  * * *  * * * * 
Capital intensity  * * * *  *  * *  * * * * *  * * * 
Comparative 
advantage  CF  ?  FF  ?  ? 
Notes: ? – unambiguous decision 
Source: own calculations 
4  FARM SPECIALIZATION – EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section we test whether observed product specialization of CF and FF is consistent 
with theoretical hypothesis and with the predictions provided in Table 7. 
Consistent data on FF and CF production structure was not available. Therefore we could 
not conduct a direct test for product specialization of FF and CF. We followed two indirect 
approaches to test our hypothesis instead. First, we tested how product structure changes with 
farm size and we note that CF are generally large and FF are small. Second, we tested how 
production structure at a country level in transition countries changes with the share of FF on 
land use. If our hypothesis holds, then in a country where FF dominate, production structure will 
be biased toward products in which FF have comparative advantage. In other transition countries 
where CF prevail, the production structure will be biased towards products in which CF have 
comparative advantage. 
We used Eurostat data to conduct the first test. We collected data for 10 CEEC: Bulgaria, 
the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  and 
Romania.  For  each  country  land  use  data  for  8  farm  size  intervals  were  collected  for  two  
 
available years: 2003 and 2005. The exception is Bulgaria and Romania for which data were 
available only for 2003 year. The following six land use categories were considered: 1) Cereals 
and  oilseeds,  2)  Industrial  plants;  3)  Forage  plants;  4)  Potatoes  and  Sugar  beet;  5)  Fresh 
vegetables, melons, strawberries; and 6) Permanent crops.  
For estimation we used OLS with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors to 
address heteroskedasticity problem. Dependent variables were the six land categories expressed 
as shares of utilized agricultural area (UAA) and averaged over the two available years: 2003 and 
2005, except for Bulgaria and Romania in which case only data for 2003 were used. Explanatory 
variables were logarithm of farm size and country dummies (not reported) to take account of the 
country specific effects. For farm size, average of the lower and upper value of each of the 8 
intervals was calculated and this value was used for estimation. Results are shown in Table 8. To 
check the robustness of our results, we conducted similar estimations for EU-15. The results are 
shown in Table 9.  
Consistent with our predictions in previous sections, large farms tend to specialize in 
cereals and oilseeds while small farms specialize in permanent crops. Since small farms tend to 
be FF while large farms are mostly CF in transition countries we can conclude that CF specialize 
in cereals and oilseeds while FF specialize in permanent crops. Results are similar for CEEC and 
EU-15. Furthermore, FF also specialize in fresh vegetables, melons and strawberries which have 
similar product characteristics to permanent crops. Inconclusive evidence was obtained for field 
crops (potatoes and sugar beet). In CEEC small farms specialize in potatoes and sugar beet while 
in EU-15 this is the opposite. It is because CEEC use more labor intensive technology to produce 
potatoes and sugar beet, while EU-15 countries use capital intensive production. Forage plants 
increase  with  the  farm  size  in  both  CEEC  and  EU-15.  This  is  an  indication  that  livestock 
production is concentrated on larger farms. Production of industrial crops also increases with 
farm size in both EU-15 and CEEC. 
The second test was performed at a country level. We conducted 4 OLS regressions with 
the following dependent variables, respectively 1) Cereals and oilseeds area as a share on arable 
and permanent crops area, 2) Labor intensive crop area
4 as a share on arable and permanent crops 
area, 3) Livestock units per hectare, and 4) Number of pig per hectare. These data was collected 
from Faostat for 23 transition countries. For each country we used average value for five years, 
1999-2003. The explanatory variables were share of FF on land use, cereal yield as a proxy for 
land quality, amount of arable land per capita, and GDP per capita as a proxy for technology. 
Various  sources  of  explanatory  variables  were  used.  Data  sources  on  FF  share  of  land  are 
reported below Table 2. Cereals yield, arable land and population were collected from Faostat, 
while GDP per capita came from the United Nations database. In total, we obtained data for each 
country for one year. Because there is no consistent time series on the share of FF on land use. 
All variables in the model are in logarithm form. The results are reported in Table 10. OLS 
estimation  with  White  heteroskedasticity  test  was  performed.  As  shown  in  Table  10,  no 
heteroskedasticity was found in all estimated models. 
 
 
Table 8: Land use specialization and farm size in CEEC 
                                                 




oilseeds (% of 
UAA) 
Industrial 








(% of UAA) 
Fresh vegetables, 
melons, strawberries (% 
of UAA) 
Permanent 
crops (% of 
UAA) 
C  9.14***  1.53*  2.29*  5.50***  1.81***  7.06*** 
Farm Size  6.12***  2.33***  0.91***  -1.31***  -0.41***  -1.60*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R-squared  0.88  0.87  0.78  0.63  0.65  0.64 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; p-value in parentheses; UAA – Utilized 
Agricultural Area 
Source: own calculations 
 
Table 9: Land use specialization and farm size in EU-15 
 
Cereals and 
oilseeds (% of 
UAA) 
Industrial 








(% of UAA) 
Fresh vegetables, 
melons, strawberries (% 
of UAA) 
Permanent 
crops (% of 
UAA) 
C  -10.32***  -1.76***  14.92***  -0.91  2.66***  17.92*** 
Farm Size  5.53***  0.66***  0.88*  0.62***  -0.73***  -6.41*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.067)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
R-squared  0.77  0.65  0.73  0.64  0.35  0.74 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; p-value in parentheses 
Source: own calculations 
 
In countries where the  share of  FF on land use is higher, a smaller area tends to be 
allocated to cereals and oilseeds and more to labor intensive crops. Furthermore, in countries 
where the share of FF on land use is higher, number of livestock and pigs per hectare is higher 
than in countries with lower share of FF on land. This is in contradiction with the prediction that 
forage increases with farm size as reported in Tables 8 and 9. This could be due to the fact that 
CF may produce forage for the market and not for farm consumption by own animals. SEROVA 
(2002)  also observes  that  in Russia  households  are  more  involved  in  livestock  breeding  and 
producing high value products like fruits and vegetables, while corporate farms are specialized in 











Livestock units per 
hectare  Pig per hectare 
-2.058  -5.98*  -6.928*  -31.571*** 
Constant 
(0.395)  (0.053)  (0.085)  (0.009) 
-0.114**  0.137*  0.199*  0.853*** 
FF 
(0.045)  (0.077)  (0.052)  (0.006) 
0.136  0.476  0.428  2.150 
CERAL YIELD 
(0.611)  (0.176)  (0.348)  (0.104) 
-0.007  -0.442***  -0.724***  0.454 
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 
(0.947)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.394) 
0.041  -0.275  -0.016  0.668 
GDP PER CAPITA (2003) 
(0.529)  (0.024)  (0.914)  (0.126) 
R-squared  0.19  0.65  0.66  0.73 
White Heteroskedasticity Test - no cross 
terms (Prob. Chi-Square)
1  0.38  0.41  0.76  0.31 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; p-value in parentheses 
Source: own calculations 
5  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In transition countries land markets are characterized by high transaction costs which help 
CF to keep their dominant positions. However, CF compete with FF for land resources and in 
domestic and international output markets. Both CF and FF specialize in commodities in which 
they  have  comparative  advantage.  This  paper  shows  that  CF  specialize  in  capital  intensive 
products and in products with low labor monitoring. FF specialize in products with higher labor 
monitoring requirement.  
The implication of this  paper is that farm structure determines in which products the 
country will be competitive on international markets. This is especially important for transition 
countries where high transaction costs hinder the change of farm organization. For this reason in 
transition countries suffering from high transaction costs the choice of product structure is more 
important than the choice of farm organization. With zero transaction costs farm organization 
would adjust as predicted by ALLEN AND LUECK (2002).  
The second implication of our paper is that the literature comparing efficiency of CF and 
FF in transition countries should also take into consideration transaction costs of using markets. 
In  many  transition  countries  output  markets  suit  large  CF  and  prevent  development  of  FF. 
Indirectly this is also related to contracting and vertical integration. Labor intensive products (e.g. 
permanent crop products such as fruits) usually require different type of contracting and vertical 
integration  than  for  example  capital  intensive  products  (such  as  cereals  and  oilseeds).  The 
existence of transaction costs in transition countries that hinder the development of contracting 
and vertical integration for one type of products will again have impact on efficiency of CF 
relative to FF.  
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